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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 880182-CA

v.
Priority No. 2

JEFFREY SCOTT,
Defendant/Appellant•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of two counts of
Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1978), and one count of Theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978).

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether defendant lacks standing to challenge the
search of the briefcase and the seizure of the stolen jewelry?
2. Whether the trial court properly found that
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the trunk and
briefcase?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const., amend. IVi
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Const., art. I S 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jeffrey Scott, was charged with two counts
of Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978), and one count of Theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) (R. 16).

Defendant was convicted as charged after a jury trial held

on February 23 through 29, 1988 in the Second Judicial District
Court, in and for Weber County, the Honorable Judge Ronald 0.
Hyde, Judge, presiding (R. 159-61).

Defendant was sentenced to

the Utah State Prison for two terms of zero to five years on the
burglary charges and to one term of one to fifteen years on the
theft charge.

Id.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On December 5, 1987, at about 9:20 p.m., the burglar
alarm was triggered at Farr's Jewelry Store located in Ogden,
Utah (T. 10).

An investigation revealed that the jewelry store

had been burglarized and that over $40,000 worth of rings,
Because the transcripts lack appellate record numbers, the
trial record will be referred to as "RM; the trial transcript as
W W
T ; and the suppression hearing transcript as "S.T."
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watches, loose diamonds, necklaces and other jewelry had been
stolen (T. 254).
Later that evening, defendant, Jeffrey Scott, departed
from the Ogden area to travel to the State of California in a
Ford Escort automobile with two other persons, Shawn Bell and
Robert Sattiewhite (T. 94-95).

Steven Farmer, the owner of the

vehicle, did not accompany the group to California (T. 258).
Nathanial Holstin, Sunday Farmer, and Lucy Turner followed
defendant in a brown Cadillac automobile with a "Dusty's" sticker
in the back window (T. 95). Holstin owned the Cadillac (T. 156).
On the way to California, Shawn Bell overheard
defendant tell Sattiewhite that he went into the wrong area and
set off the alarm (T. 96). She also overheard defendant and
Sattiewhite discuss numbers like 50,000 and 20,000 and overheard
defendant indicate he had put in a hard nights work (T. 97-98).
The next day on December 6, 1987, a confidential
informant notified the police with information that Robert
Sattiewhite and an unknown black male driving a brown Cadillac
with a "Dusty's" sticker in the back window were involved in the
Farr's burglary (T. 601). The confidential informant also
informed the police that the two suspects were on their way to
California (T. 602).
On the same day near Barstow, California, California
Highway Patrol Officer Curtis Nester stopped the Escort and
Cadillac for speeding at approximately 93 miles per hour (T.
153).

As Officer Nester approached the Escort, Bell saw

defendant put a little bag inside of his pants (T. 100).

-3-

Defendant had an open beer bottle between his legs when the
officer arrived at the car (T. 158). The officer asked
defendant, who was driving, for his driver's license and car
registration (T 155). Defendant failed to produce any personal
identification or car registration.

Id.

After obtaining the registration for the Cadillac, the
officer again approached defendant and asked him to exit the
Escort (T. 156). When he asked defendant his name, defendant
gave the name of Jeffrey Boyd (T. 157). The officer proceeded to
the passenger side of the Escort and asked Bell, who was sitting
in the front passenger seat, what was defendant's name (P. 157).
Bell told the officer that defendant's real name was Jeffrey
Scott (T. 101, 157). Defendant then admitted to the officer that
he had given a false name and produced a travel pass issued by
the California Parole Board to Jeffrey Scott.

Ici. Defendant was

evasive to the officer about the details of his destination and
purpose for traveling to California (T. 158).
Sattiewhite and Bell exited the Escort and the officer
searched the interior of the car for other open beer bottles (T.
158)

Officer Nester then asked defendant for permission to

search the trunk (S.T. 79, 84, 91. T. 159). Defendant replied,
"sure, go ahead, you can look in the trunk", and defendant
secured the keys from the ignition and opened the trunk (S.T. 97.
T. 160). The search of the trunk revealed a brown leather
briefcase which all the vehicle occupants denied any knowledge or
ownership of.

(S.T. 79-80, 98. T. 102-03, 161). The officer

then asked defendant for consent to open the briefcase to which
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defendant again consented (S.T. 98-99, 104, 109. T. 102-03, 161).
The briefcase was dicovered to contain a large amount of jewelry
(T. 103, 161). The vehicle occupants, including defendant,
denied any interest in the jewelry (T. 104, 161). Some of the
jewelry had tags and/or inscriptions which indicated that the
jewelry was from the "Farr's Jewlery Store." (T. 165).
At this time, Sergeant James Pitsor arrived at the
scene (T. 199). Officer Nester told Sergeant Pitsor that he had
discovered a large quantity of jewelry pursuant to a consent
search (T. 199). Pitsor received a radio dispatch from Odgen
that confirmed a burglary at Farr's Jewelry Store and that a
brown Cadillac was involved in the robbery (T. 163, 202). A
consent form was then filled out to search the Cadillac (S.T.
46).

All six suspects were arrested in California and extradited

to Utah (T. 125-26).
On February 12, 1987, defendant filed a motion to
suppress the evidence claiming lack of consent for the search (R.
48-58).

At the suppression hearing, Officer Nester testified

that the defendant had voluntarily consented to the search of the
trunk and briefcase (S.T. 22-3, 39-41).

Lucy Turner testified

that she heard the officer ask defendant if he could look in the
trunk (S.T. 84). Although she could not verify that defendant
was the person who gave consent, she testified that she heard
someone consent to the search and that defendant never objected
to it (S.T. 79, 84-85, 91-92).

Shawn Bell testified that when

the officer asked defendant if he could look in the briefcase,
defendant consented (S.T. 98-99, 104, 106, 109). Defendant

-5-

testified that he owned the briefcase and that he had objected to
the search by the officer (S.T. 6, 8). Judge Hyde denied
defendant's suppression motion three grounds; that defendant had
voluntarily consented to the search, that probable cause for the
search had been established, and that the defendant lacked
standing to contest the search.

(Transcript of Closing Arguments

dated February 22, 1988 at p. 14).
Onan Ford, defendant's cellmate in the Weber County
Jail, confidentially informed the police that defendant had
admitted committing the Farr's burglary with Robert Sattiewhite
and that Sattiewhite had tripped the alarm (T. 377-78).

Ford

also stated that defendant was hiding diamonds in his mattress in
the jail cell and that the diamonds were from the Farr's burglary
(T. 379-80).

Apparently, defendant had concealed the diamonds

from the police by hiding them in his "crotch" (T. 379). Based
on this information, a search warrant was obtained for
defendant's cell at the Weber County Jail on February 19, 1988
(R. 112). The search revealed 14 diamonds hidden in defendant's
mattress (R. 115-16).
At trial, a footprint taken from the scene of the crime
was positively identified as that of defendant's (P. 473).
Robert Sattiewhite, who pled guilty to the Farr's burglary,
testified that defendant had been his accomplice in the Farr's
burglary (T. 535).
Based on the evidence, defendant was convicted by a
jury of the theft and burglary (R. 143-450.)

Defendant now

appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence
obtained pursuant to the search of the trunk and the briefcase.
-6-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant lacks standing to protest the search of the
briefcase and seizure of the stolen jewelry because defendant
neither owned the car he was driving nor demonstrated a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle or its contents.
The trial court properly found that the search was
validly based on defendant's voluntary consent.

Such a finding

should only be set aside when it is against the clear weight of
evidence, or if the court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.

Where there is

substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding of
voluntary consent, this Court should not disturb the trial
court's ruling.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
SEARCH OF THE BRIEFCASE AND THE SEIZURE OF
THE STOLEN JEWELRY.
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred
in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the
search of the trunk and briefcase.

Defendant's claim should be

rejected because he lacks standing to challenge the search of the
trunk or briefcase and subsequent seizure of the stolen jewelry.
Because defendant limits his standing argument to the
federal constitution, the State's response will be confined to
the federal Constitution. See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973,
n. 1 (Utah App. 1988).
In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the United
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States Supreme Court addressed the question of standing to
protest an alleged unlawful search. In Rakas, the Court
articulated the rule that a defendant has standing to challenge a
search if defendant can establish "a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place."

Jd. at 143. The Court rejected

the earlier standard of "legitimately on the premises" as set
forth in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) and held
that fourth amendment rights are personal and do not extend to
the search of another's premises or property,

^d. at 133. Thus,

a defendant "who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property
will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy"
in the property. Jd. at 144 n.12.

But, a defendant who asserts

neither a property nor a possessory interest in an item, nor an
interest in the property seized, has no legitimate expectation of
privacy and thus lacks standing,

Ijd. at 148.

Further, "[t]he

proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing
that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
challenged search or seizure."

Rakas, 439 U.S. 131 n.l.

The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and applied the
Rakas standing rule. In State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah
1984), the use of evidence obtained from a vehicle which the
defendant was driving was challenged under both the Utah and
United States Constitutions. The search was upheld because
"[d]efendant concede[d] that he did not own the car or the
attache case [found in the trunk] containing the evidence
complained of, and [thus] failed to show that he had any
legitimate expectation of privacy in the effects searched."

-8-

Id.

at 1335.
More recently, in State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125,
126-27 (Utah 1987), the Court held that the evidence obtained
pursuant to a warrantless search of a vehicle was admissible
since
[d]efendant presented no testimony that he
had driven the car with the permission of the
owner that he had borrowed the car under
circumstances that would imply permissive
use. Absent claimed right to possession, he
could not assert any expectation of privacy
in the items seized and had no standing to
object to the search.
This Court has also applied the Rakas standing rule in
State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987), where a California
resident was driving a vehicle registered to a New York resident.
The driver gave consent to search the vehicle and the officer
found a secret compartment in the trunk which held cocaine.

The

defendant in that case denied any knowledge of the compartment
and its contents and presented no evidence at the suppression
hearing of his permission to possess the vehicle.

In DeAlo, as

in the present case,
[Djefendant denied any ownership in the car
and any knowledge of the secret compartment
or its illegal contents. The only
substantive evidence defendant presented at
the suppression hearing was the testimony of
the arresting officer that it was his
understanding Rafael Villa was using the car
with his brother's permission. No other
witnesses were called and no other evidence
was presented. It might be argued the
officer's testimony established some
expectation of privacy on the part of Villa.
That certainly does not establish an
expectation of privacy on the part of
defendant.

-9-

Id. at 196.

This Court held that the defendant may have had an

expectation of privacy in this own personal belongings in the
vehicle, but not in the vehicle itself.

The defendant had not

shown "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area where the
cocaine was found.
the search...."

Therefore, he had no standing to object to

J^i. at 197.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that defendant did
not own the vehicle he was driving (S.T. 4). Moreover, at the
suppression hearing, defendant presented no evidence of his right
to use the vehicle.

Although defendant did testify that he had

permission to be in the vehicle, the fact that the defendant may
have been "legitimately on [the] premises" in that he may have
been in the vehicle with the owner's permission does not
determine whether he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the particular area of the automobile searched.

Rakas v.

Illinois, 439 U.S. at 148.
The only material difference between the facts in Rakas
and the facts in the present case is that here the defendant was
the driver of the vehicle rather than a passenger.

The

defendant's temporary status as the driver, without more,
entitles him to no greater expectation of privacy as to the
contents of the vehicle than that of the defendant in Rakas.
State v. Emery, 41 Or.App. 35, 597 P.2d 375, 376 (1979).

See

also, People v. Flowers, 111 Ill.App.3d 348, 67 111.Dec. 203, 444
N.E.2d 242, 246 (1982)(nonowner driver had no different status
relative to the vehicle and its contents than did the defendant
in Rakas); United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 695 (1st Cir.
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1982)(defendant's expectation of privacy based on the fact that
he was driving the car when stopped was insufficient to establish
a privacy expectation).
Defendant attempts to establish an expectation of
privacy in the briefcase by recanting his earlier disclaimer of
ownership (S.T. 4. 8). However, for a defendant to have standing
to make a Fourth Amendment claim, a defendant must not disclaim
ownership of the searched item at the time of the search. In
Rakas, Valdez, Constantino, and DeAlo, each search was upheld
because it was clearly established and undisputed prior to the
search that the defendant did not own nor have an interest in the
property searched.
The Utah Supreme Court has found it to be a "specious"
argument for a criminal defendant to deceptively claim no
interest in an item to be searched and then later attack the
seizure on Fourth Amendment grounds. State v. Meyers, 21 Utah 2d
110, 441 P.2d 510, 511 (1968).

Others courts have found that a

person has no standing to complain of the search of property he
has voluntarily abandoned.

See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.

217, 240-41 (1960); State v. Mahone, 67 Haw. 644, 701 P.2d 171,
175 (1985); Menefee v. State, 640 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Okl. Cr.
1982); and State v. Salit, 613 P.2d 245, 255-56 (Alaska 1980).
The rationale being that abandoned property loses its privacy
expectation.

State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, 857 (Utah 1978).

Whether property is abandoned is primarily Ma question
of intent, and intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts
done, and other objective facts.

•' State v. Mahone, 701 P. 2d at
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175, quoting, United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th
Cir. 1973) limited by Hawkins v. State, 758 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.
Cr.App. 1988).

Several courts have stated that a verbal

disclaimer of ownership constitutes an abandonment of Fourth
Amendment protection.

See United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199

(9th Cir.1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982); United States
v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S.
958 (1979); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir.
1973) .
Under the facts of the present case, it is
uncontroverted that defendant verbally denied any knowledge or
ownership of the seized property at the time of the search (S.T.
6-7, 23). Defendant's denial of ownership demonstrates his
intention to voluntarily abandon the briefcase and its
incriminating contents.

As a result, it is uncontested that

defendant abandoned the property and thereby relinquished any
privacy interest he may have had concerning the briefcase.
This Court's recent ruling in State v. Holmes, 107 Utah
Adv. Rep. 74, 78, n. 5 (Ct. App. 5/03/89), is distinguishable
from and not controlling in the case at bar.

In Holmes, as a

policeman approached a car, the officer saw the defendant remove
a roll of towels from her purse and attempt to stuff it down
between the car seat and the console.

The officer retrieved the

towels which contained cocaine. Although the defendant denied
the towels were hers, this Court noted that her mere disclaimer
of ownership in the context of a police query was insufficient in
itself to deny the defendant standing to challenge the legality
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of search.

In reaching its holding, this court relied on State

v. Allen, 93 Wash.2d 170, 606 P.2d 1235, 1236 (1980) where the
evidence was found on the defendant's person and the Washington
Supreme Court found that there was no question that the defendant
had standing to contest the search.
Holmes is not controlling in the present case because
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Meyers, 21 Utah 2d 110, 441
?.2d 510, 511 (Utah 1968) has previously held that a disclaimer
in response to police questioning is sufficient to waive a
privacy right.

This Court cannot disregard and circumvent Utah

precedent by following Washington case law.

Moreover, it is

significant to note that standing pursuant to Washington law is
considerably different than standing according to Utah law.

For

example, Washington accords automatic standing if possession is
an element of the crime and if the defendant was in possession of
the item at the time it was seized.

See State v. Goodman, 42

Wash.App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1985).
recognize automatic standing.

Utah does not

Also, the Washington court relied

on Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), which the United
States Supreme Court in Rakas explicitly rejected as the test for
standing.

Since

the Utah Supreme Court follows Rakas, this Court

was misguided to rely on Allen.
Further, the factual circumstanceis presented in the
Holmes and Allen cases differ significantly from the present
case.

In Holmes and Allen, the seized property was obviously

that of the defendant and the police took advantage of the
disclaimer to deny the defendant standing to challenge the

-13-

search.

In the case at bar, it was not obvious that the

briefcase belonged to the defendant.

Defendant denied ownership

in the vehicle and the briefcase (T. 161-62).

There was no

vehicle registration to prove the truth or falsity of defendant's
disclaimer (S.T. 11). Since it was not obvious that defendant
was the owner of the briefcase and the officer's only information
was defendant's disclaimer of ownership, defendant should not
benefit from his false statement by now challenging the search
which was based on his false representation.
Finally, in order to have standing to challenge an
alleged unlawful search, a defendant must have asserted at least
a "claimed right [of] possession" in the item prior to the
search.

Constantino, 732 P.2d at 127. Having failed to assert a

claim in the trunk or briefcase at the time of the search,
defendant lacks standing to object to the search.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH.
Even assuming defendant has standing to challenge the
search, defendant's claim should be disregarded because the trial
court properly found that defendant voluntarily consented to the
warrantless search.
In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, this
Court will not set aside a trial court's finding unless it is
••clearly erroneous" giving due deference to the court's
determination of the credibility of the witnesses State v. Kelly,
92 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 3 (S. Ct. 9/23/88), citing State v. Ashe,
745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Lafferty, 749
14-

P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1988) On Rehearing 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 21
(S.Ct. 5/30/89); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

The definition of

"clearly erroneous" was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court from
the parallel Federal Rules of Procedure. State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

In

interpreting the Federal Rules, the United State Supreme Court in
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948) defined "clearly erroneous" as follows:
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when
although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.
Id. quoted in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d at 193.
In Walker, the Utah Supreme Court further clarified the
standard of review by referring to Wright & Miller as follows:
The appellate court . . . does not
consider and weigh the evidence de novo. The
mere fact that on the same evidence the
appellate court might have reached a
different result does not justify it in
setting the findings aside. It may regard a
finding as clearly erroneous only if the
finding is without adequate evidentiary
support or induced by an erroneous view of
the law.
Walker, at 193, quoting, Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, S 2585 (1971).

In sum, this court will

not set aside a trial court's finding of voluntary consent to
search unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or
if the court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.

Walker, at 193; State v. Ashe, 745

P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).
In determining whether an accused's consent to search
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was given voluntarily, the Utah Supreme Court adheres to the
"totality of circumstances*1 standard as set forth in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).

In Schneckloth, the United

States Supreme Court recognized that voluntary consent to search
is an exception to the general search warrant and probable cause
requirements,

Ld. The Court adopted the "totality of the

circumstances" test in determining whether consent was given
voluntarily.

Ld. at 226.

Some of the factors against

voluntariness may be the accused's youth, lack of education, low
intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his
constitutional rights, the length of detention, repeated
questioning, or the use of threats, duress, promises or other
coercion.

^Id*

In determining if a consent to search was

voluntarily given, a court may consider the factual circumstances
surrounding the consent, assess the psychological impact on the
accused, and evaluate the legal significance of how the accused
reacted.

Id.
Applying the voluntariness test to the present facts,

the record clearly indicates that defendant consented to the
search of the vehicle he was driving.

Defendant had been legally

stopped on the side of an interstate highway for a speeding
violation (T. 153-54).
the morning

The stopped occurred at 10:00 o'clock in

(T. 155). Defendant, who was on parole, was well

acquainted with the law having been convicted of two prior
felonies (S.T. 9). When Officer Nester asked defendant if he
would consent to a search of the trunk, defendant replied, "Go
ahead, you can search the trunk" (S.T. 22). Defendant again
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consented to the search of the briefcase (S.T. 23). Defendant's
verbal consent to search was witnessed by the other occupants of
the vehicle which corroborated the officer's story (S.T. 98-99,
106, 109).
Defendant argues that even if he gave consent, it was
given involuntarily as a result of duress or coercion.

In State

v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court
set forth five factors which may show a lack of duress or
coercion:
1) the absence of a claim of authority to
search by the officers; 2) the absence of an
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a
mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the
owner of vehicle; and 5) the absence of
deception or trick on the part of the
officer.
jld. at 106.
In the case at bar, there is no evidence that coercion
or duress was placed upon defendant or anyone else to consent to
the search.

When the officer asked defendant for permission to

search the trunk, defendant was not in custody.

Although

defendant was not free to leave, the atmosphere of detention at
the scene had none of the coercive aspects of questioning at a
police station.

Moreover, Nester did not claim any authority to

search or deceive defendant into thinking he had a search warrant
or the right to search the trunk.

In fact, Nester had just

finished searching the interior of the car pursuant a lawful
search for open beer bottles (T. 159). By asking permission to
search the trunk, Nester indicated to defendant that his
authority to search did not extend to the trunk without
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defendant's permission.

Although two other officers were at the

scene, Sergeant Pitsor did not arrive until after the consent had
been given (T. 199). Thus, the presence of additional officers
did not create an undue show of authority.
When Officer Nester requested permission to search, he
simply asked if he could search the trunk and the briefcase to
which defendant replied, "sure, go ahead" (T. 160, 161).
Defendant in fact cooperated with the officer by retrieving the
keys from the ignition and opening the trunk (T. 160). Moreover,
the record is completely devoid of any evidence of a show or
threat of force by the officer.
Defendant makes several miscellaneous arguments which,
upon closer scrutiny, are irrelevant to the voluntariness of his
consent to search.

He argues that he knew the stolen jewelry was

in the trunk and therefore it would have been illogical for him
to consent in the absence of duress or coercion.

However,

defendant may have purposefully cooperated with the police to
appear unknowing and consented to the search so as to avoid
further suspicion.

Also, the fact that Officer Nester may have

had other grounds whereby he could have legally searched the
trunk is not dispositive of the issue of consent.

Moreover,

since a written consent form is not required to establish a
voluntary consent search, it is not significant that defendant
did not sign or read a search consent form.

Finally, the fact

that a written consent form was used for a subsequent search of a
different vehicle of another party neither adds nor detracts from
the voluntariness of defendant's consent.
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Under the totality of the circumstances test, and
giving due deference to the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the search of the vehicle was
j
performed pursuant to defendant's voluntary consent. Thus, this
court should affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, respondent requests that
defendant's convictions be affirmed.
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Citation of Supplemental Authorities on
State v. Scott, Case No. 880182-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, respondent wishes to cite supplemental authorities in
support of the Brief of Respondent. This Court's recent decision
in State v. Grueber, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Ct. App. June 3,
1989) and the California Court of Appeals decision in People v.
Dasilva, 207 Cal.App.3d 43, 254 Cal.Rptr. 563 (Ct. App. 1989) are
relevant to the issues discussed in Point I of the Brief of
Respondent.
Thank you for your consideration.
Very truly yours,

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Section
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